Recently, there has been a growing interest in network scenarios where selfish agents are able to communicate, bargain and form coalitions, i.e., play a cooperative game, in order to overcome the inefficiency of noncooperative equilibria. We study such coalitional games under worst-case conditions in the fundamental load-balancing setting of routing over parallel links. Specifically, we investigate fundamental solution concepts of the considered cooperative game, namely the (Inner) Core and the min-max fair Nucleolus. Most notably, we prove that under certain conditions they contain the system optimum.
Introduction
To date, game theoretic models have been employed in virtually all networking contexts. These include control tasks at the network layer, such as flow control and routing (e.g., [1, 19, 25, 29] ) as well as numerous studies on control tasks at the link and MAC layers. In particular, research up until now in routing games has mainly focused on non-cooperative networking games, where the selfish decision makers (i.e., the users or agents) cannot communicate and reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the network infrastructure. Moreover, the main dynamics that were considered were Best-Response, i.e., each agent would observe the present state of the network and react to it in a selfoptimizing manner. Accordingly, the operating points of such systems were taken to be some equilibria of the underlying non-cooperative game, most notably Nash equilibria. Such equilibria are inherently inefficient [7] and, in general, exhibit suboptimal network performance. As a result, the question of how bad the quality of a non-cooperative equilibrium is with respect to a centrally enforced optimum has received considerable attention e.g., [8, 17, 29] .
However, there is a growing number of networking scenarios where, while there is competition among self-optimizing agents, there is also a possibility for these agents to communicate, negotiate and reach a binding agreement. Indeed, in many scenarios, the competition is among business organizations, which can, and often do, reach agreements (e.g., SLAs) on the way that they provide, consume or share the network resources. The proper framework for analyzing such settings is that of Cooperative Game Theory [23] . Such a paradigm transfer, from non-cooperative to cooperative games, calls to revisit fundamental concepts. Indeed, the operating point of the network is not an equilibrium of a noncooperative game anymore, but rather a solution concept of a cooperative game. Accordingly, the performance degradation of such systems should be considered at new operating points. Such an operating point has been proposed in [5] , which considered the adoption of the Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) [24] as a way of reducing the potentially high inefficiency of the Nash Equilibrium. Nevertheless, the NBS only contemplates two scenarios, namely the "grand coalition" (i.e., an agreement reached by all agents) and the disagreement point, i.e., the outcome of the fully non-cooperative scenario. Thus, while bargaining between entities is encouraged at the NBS, it might be advantageous for a group to deviate from the proposed strategy and form subcoalitions.
Coalitional games have been considered in various networking contexts, e.g., wireless packet-forwarding [10] , routing and flow-control in ad-hoc networks [9] , cognitive radio [20] , access networks [3] , random medium access systems [21] and profit sharing in wireless networks [32] to name a few. For a clear overview of coalitional game theory in communication networks, see [30] .
When considering a coalitional game with N agents, a major question is what cost should be attributed to each of the 2 N coalitions? One might consider coalitions to be in competition with each other and equate their cost to an equilibrium point of a noncooperative scenario. This implicitly assumes that all agents in a coalition optimize their own costs and do not care (either way) about the performance of agents in other coalitions. However, and in particular in the context of networking, there exist scenarios in which some agents do not care about optimizing their own cost, but act maliciously (or seem to act maliciously) towards other coalitions, [4, 6, 13, 22] . Such behavior could be due to a range of reasons, e.g., hackers, rivaling companies or countries that aim to degrade network quality. In addition, it may happen that some agents are not aware of how to optimize their cost, hence they might exhibit seemingly "irrational", thus unexpected, behavior. In light of such settings, we choose the cost of a coalition to equal its worst-case scenario, in order to investigate what amount of resources it can guarantee under any (including worst) condition.
We concretize our study of coalitions under worst-case scenarios by considering the framework of routing in a "parallel links" network. Beyond being a basic framework of routing, this is the generic framework of load balancing among servers in a network. It has been the subject of numerous studies in the context of non-cooperative networking games, e.g., [11, 17, 19, 25, 28] , to name a few. In particular, in order to represent the cost of each coalition, we focus on the worst-case scenario of a Stackelberg game [23] , where an adversary, which acts as "leader", tries to maximize the cost of the coalition, which acts as "follower". Quite surprisingly, we establish that the leader acts as if it were a continuum of infinitesimal (i.e., nonatomic) self-optimizing agents.
With the above structural results at hand, our goal is to propose system optimal and stable allocations to agents, such that they have no desire to deviate, while bringing forth the system optimum. We do so by describing the Core and a further refinement of the Core, called the Inner Core, [23] . The Inner Core provides stability even in cases where there exists a mediator who proposes a set of deviating coalitions and a probability distribution on the formation of each coalition. We show that the system optimal Proportional Allocation (PA) typically lies in the (Inner) Core, i.e., if all agents send their flow proportionately with regard to the system optimum, no (randomized) coalition is willing to deviate from the proposed routing strategy.
We then concentrate on a particular allocation, which is known for it min-max fairness properties, called the Nucleolus [31] . 1 We show that, in the considered game, the Nucleolus is equal to the Proportional Allocation when agents have either symmetric demands or symmetric threats. In general, the computation of a feasible Nucleolus incurs exponential complexity, yet, for the game that we consider, we are able to establish a polynomial bound for a typical case. The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows:
-We formulate a Non-Transferable Utility Coalitional Game, where we represent the cost of each coalition as the follower's cost in its worst-case Stackelberg game.
-Surprisingly, we establish that for the worst-case Stackelberg game, the malicious leader acts as if it is a continuum of infinitesimal self-optimizing users. -We show that, in our coalitional game, the system optimal Proportional Allocation is stable, i.e., it lies in the Core and typically in the Inner Core. -Under assumptions of symmetry, we show that the Proportional Allocation is equal to the min-max fair Nucleolus. Moreover, for a typical case, we establish an efficient bound on its computation.
Model and Game Theoretic Formulations

Model
Following [25] , we are given a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N } of selfish "users" (or, "players", "agents"), which share a set of parallel "links" (e.g., communication links, servers, etc.) L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, interconnecting a common source node to a common destination node, see Figure 1 . Let c l be the capacity of link l. Each We denote by f i l the flow of user i ∈ N on link l ∈ L. Thus, user i can fix any value for f i l , as long as f i l ≥ 0 (non-negativity constraint) and l∈L f i l = r i (demand constraint). Denote the total demand of all the users by R, i.e., R = i∈N r i . We only consider capacity configurations c = [c 1 . . . c L ] for which l c l > R. Turning our attention to a link l ∈ L, let f l be the total flow on that link i.e., f l = i∈N f i l ; also, denote by f l the vector of all user flows on link l ∈ L, i.e., f l = (f 1 l , f 2 l , . . . , f N l ). The routing strategy of user i, f i , is the vector
The routing strategy profile f is the vector of all user routing strategies, f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f N ). We say that a user's routing strategy is feasible if its components obey the nonnegativity and demand constraints. Similarly, a routing strategy profile is feasible if it is composed of feasible routing strategies and we denote by F the set of all feasible f 's. The set F is compact and convex.
The performance measure of a user i ∈ N is given by a cost function J i (f ). In our case, the performance of a link l is manifested through some function T l (f l ), which measures the cost per unit of flow on the link, and depends on the link's total flow. For example, T l may be the delay of link l. Specifically, we consider users whose cost functions assume the following form:
Cost functions that comply with the above assumptions shall be referred to as standard. Agents with standard cost functions are denoted as atomic users.
An N -tuple of positive values J = (J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J N ) is said to be a feasible cost vector if there is a feasible (routing) strategy profile f ∈ F such that, for all
Denote the set of feasible cost vectors by J . It follows from our assumptions on standard cost functions that the minimization of J i (f ) is equivalent to the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) [18] conditions: for every ∀l, n ∈ L,
In the remainder of the paper we will refer to (1) as the Best-Response dynamics of an atomic user. Note that if T l (f l ) is the average delay per unit of flow, then the corresponding standard cost function is the widely used total delay function (in our case, per user). We also note that the technical Assumption S6 holds for interesting classes of cost functions, such as link delays under the M/M/1 queueing model, where T l (f l ) = 1 c l −f l . Finally, we order the links such that ∀l < n, c l ≤ c n . Hence, assumption S6 effectively implies a "quality" ordering of the links. In the rest of the paper, cost functions shall be assumed to be standard.
Nonatomic users
Although in this study we focus on atomic users, i.e., a finite set of (nonzero-size) users such that each can split its flow among links, some of the following results state that at times a user may behave as if it is a continuum of infinitesimal self-optimizing users, referred to as nonatomic users. A nonatomic user places its demand on a single linkl, for which Tl(fl) = min l∈L T l (f l ), [34] . If an atomic user i behaves as if it is a set of self-optimizing nonatomic users, it follows from the KKT conditions that, ∀l, n ∈ L:
We will refer to (2) as the Best-Response dynamics of a set of nonatomic users. In the specific case where all users behave according to (2) , it holds that ∀l, n ∈ L:
When the link flows behave according to (3), the system is said to be in the unique Wardrop equilibrium, [34] . Accordingly, ∀l ∈ L with f l > 0, T l (f l ) ≡ T .
System Optimization
As commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., [2, 15, 17, 19, 28, 29] ), the welfare of a system is measured by the sum of the individual costs of the players, i.e., by a ("social") cost function J sys defined as J sys = i∈N J i . We denote by J * sys the optimal value of the system's cost, i.e., the minimal value of J sys over all feasible routing strategy profiles. In the case of standard cost functions, we have:
Note that, for standard costs, J sys depends only on the total flows on the links. Accordingly, for such costs, we denote by f * = (f * l ) l∈L the unique ( [25] ) optimal vector of link flows, i.e., J * sys = l∈L f * l · T l (f * l ). A recurring routing strategy in this study is the proportional routing strategy where all users send their flow proportionally with regard to the system optimum:
Denote the corresponding vector of user costs as the Proportional Allocation (PA), namely:
Coalitional game
We proceed to formalize our coalitional game, by attributing a set of costs to every coalition S ⊆ N . Note that our standard cost functions represent a variety of costs, e.g., delay, which are not considered to be a commodity that users can freely transfer between themselves, hence we define a Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) Game [23] .
Definition 1. A NTU coalitional game consists of a mapping V (·) that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a set of outcomes V (S) ⊆ R |S| , which is non-empty, closed and convex. 2 A coalition behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its participants and V (S) represents the set of feasible cost allocations that S can achieve for itself.
In section 4 we define a worst-case representation of V (S) for each coalition. A specific instance of an NTU game is when side payments are allowed, namely a Transferable Utility (TU) game.
The value v(S) denotes the cost of S that can be achieved when side payments are allowed. In Section 4 we will see how, in our context, we can consider a TU game by smartly exchanging flows between users.
Worst-Case Stackelberg Game
As explained in the introduction, our goal is to propose system optimal, fair and stable cost-allocations to all N users. However, once a coalition of users, S, decides to deviate from our proposed solution, we model it to incur a worst-case cost. Specifically, for every coalition that deviates (there are 2 N −1 such possible coalitions), we define a new 2-player game, with a cost-minimizing player S and a malicious player N \S. All users in S work together to minimize the sum of their costs i∈S J i and all users in N \S, cooperate in order to maximize the cost of i∈S J i . Denote the malicious player as S 0 with routing strategy f 0 and demand r 0 . Further denote the cost-minimizing player as S 1 with routing strategy f 1 and demand r 1 . Practically, such a scenario can be achieved when all agents issue a credible threat and act offensively towards any coalition of agents that deviate from the proposed cost allocation.
Specifically, we consider a worst-case Stackelberg game, where the malicious leader S 0 , aims to maximize the cost of the follower S 1 , namely the cost J 1 (f ) = l∈L f 1 l T l (f l ). In turn, S 1 replies to f 0 with a Best-Response strategy, i.e., for any given f 0 :
Accordingly S 0 picks a routing strategyf 0 such that 3 :
Theorem 1. At the outcome of the worst-case Stackelberg game, user S 0 achieves (7) by sending its flow according to (2) , while user S 1 sends its flow according to (1) . Thus, S 0 achieves (7) by sending its flow according to the Best-Response dynamics of a set of self-optimizing non-atomic users with an aggregated demand of r 0 .
Proof. The malicious leader, S 0 , aims to send its demand r 0 according to (7) and reduces the capacity of each link byf 0 l , such that, when S 1 responds according to (6) , its cost is maximized. Accordingly, through the eyes of the follower, the amount of flowf 0 l corresponds to a reduction in capacity, since ∀l ∈ L,
. As a result, S 1 can be viewed as a single optimizing user in a network with a capacity configurationĉ l = c l − f 0 l ∀l ∈ L, andf 1 is equal to the optimal routing strategy in that network. Denote by J 1 (f 0 ,f 1 (f 0 )) = J * sys (c − f 0 ) the cost of user S 1 after sending its flow according to (6) in a network with capacity configuration c − f 0 . Hence, the leader S 0 aims to route its flow such that:f
Due to Assumption S6, it is straightforward that, without loss of generality, we can concentrate on capacity configurations c that preserve the initial link order, that is, configurations with
(Similarly, see [16] ). We continue the proof of the theorem through the establishment of two lemmas. The first lemma shows that the leader can increase J * sys (c − f 0 ) by sending an increased amount of demand on the links with a high initial capacity. 1)). Furthermore, consider two links {1, q}, q > 1, routing strategies f 0 (3), f 0 (4),
Proof. To shorten notation we considerf 1 (f 0 (j)) =f 1 (j) for j = 1, 2, i.e., the Best-Response of S 1 to f 0 (i). In order to prove that J * sys (c − f 0 (2)) ≤ J * sys (c − f 0 (1)), we construct a routing strategyf 1 for S 1 in a network with f 0 (2) for which J 1 (f 0 (2),f 1 ) ≤ J 1 (f 0 (1),f 1 (1)) = J * sys (c − f 0 (1)). By definition, the cost of S 1 after using its Best-Response strategy,f 1 (2), will be less or equal to our proposed strategy,f 1 , i.e. 4 :
First, we initiatef 1 =f 1 (1). We consider two cases: (1) ∆ ≥ r 1 −f 1 1 (1) and (2) ∆ < r 1 −f 1 1 (1). First consider Case 1. We construct a feasible strategy for user S 1 by sending r 1 on link 1, thus decreasing its cost:
Now consider Case 2 and link q. If ∆ −f 1 q (1) ≤ 0, we send over a flow of ∆ from link q to 1. Else, we send a flowf 1 q (1) from link q to link 1 and randomly consider a different link q > 1. We repeat this procedure for q . Since L is finite and ∆ < r 1 −f 1 1 (1), we will reach a link s for which ∆ − k∈Ff 
The inequality of (11) follows since, ∀l ∈ L,
This concludes the first part of the lemma. Now, consider routing strategies f 0 (3), f 0 (4), as specified in the lemma and assume by contradiction that J * sys (c − f 0 (4)) < J * sys (c − f 0 (3)). Moreover, consider routing strategy f 0 (5) where f 0 1 (5) = f 0 1 (4) − ∆, f 0 q (5) = f 0 q (4) + ∆ and ∀l\{1, q}, f 0 l (5) = f 0 l (4). In the first part of the lemma we have proven that J * sys (c − f 0 (5)) ≤ J * sys (c − f 0 (4)). However, f 0 (5) = f 0 (3), which is a contradiction.
Through Lemma 1, we have proven that it is in the malicious Stackelberg leader's interest to send more flow on the links with the initial highest capacity. We define a routing strategyf 0 as optimal (for the leader) if, for any other routing strategy
Lemma 2. If S 0 behaves according to (2) , its routing strategy is optimal.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists an optimal routing strategy f 0 and link l > 1, for which f 0 l > 0 and T l (f 0 l +f 1 l ) > T 1 (f 0 1 +f 1 1 ). Then, we can construct a new routing strategyf 0 that moves flow from link l to link 1 until either T l (f 0 l +f 1 l (f 0 )) = T 1 (f 0 1 +f 1 1 (f 0 )) orf 0 l = 0. According to Lemma 1, this does not decrease the cost of S 1 . Thus,f 0 is also optimal. We can repeat this construction for every such link l and the lemma follows.
According to Theorem 1, in a worst-case Stackelberg game, the follower can expect its rival leader to act as if it were a set of infinitesimal nonatomic users. This structural result will be employed in the investigation of the coalitional game that follows. Moreover, it is a rather surprising result of independent interest.
Worst-Case Coalitions
We now proceed to describe our coalitional game as defined in Definition 1. We let each coalition S, correspond to the follower in the worst-case Stackelberg game, where the users N \S act as the malicious leader. Denotef (S) as the routing strategy profile in which S acts according to (1) and N \S acts according to (2) . Also denoteĴ(S) as the cost vector of all users, when behaving according tô f (S). Furthermore, denote by (J(S)) i∈S , the projection ofĴ(S) unto R S , i.e., the cost vector of the users in the coalition. We now define our mapping of V (S). It follows immediately from [27] that, for all S, the aggregated flow of all users in S, i∈Sf i l (S), is unique, hence V (S) is well defined. However, V (S) is not a singleton for |S| > 1, since any two users i, j ∈ S can exchange flows between each other without changing the aggregated flow on each link.
In order for our worst-case NTU coalitional game to satisfy the conditions of Definition 1 we still need to show that V (S) is closed and convex. Closure follows trivially from S3. Regarding convexity, consider two cost vectors of the users in coalition S, (J(S)) i∈S , (J(S)) i∈S ∈ V (S). It follows that for any α ∈ [0, 1] and ∀i ∈ S:
since F is convex. Having defined the worst-case coalitional game, we proceed to investigate it through the study of several (fair and stable) solution concepts of cooperative game theory.
The (Inner) Core
We continue to describe a known solution concept, which is stable against coalitional deviations. 
Theorem 2. The Core is not a singleton and the Proportional Allocation, (5) lies in the Core. 5
Proof. Consider a deviating coalition of users, S. In Theorem 1, we have proven that the malicious Stackelberg leader (composed of the users N \S) acts according to (2) . It follows from a result in [33] (Theorem 5.2), that for two subsets S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N with i∈S1 r i > i∈S2 r i :
Furthermore, the inequality is strict if the system does not behave according to (3) and it is equal if i∈S1 r i = i∈S2 r i . In particular, from (12), when S 1 = N , it follows that ∀S ⊂ N :
Thus, if a coalition S wishes to deviate from the proposed PA, there must exist a user i ∈ S, for which r i R J * sys ≤Ĵ i (S). This proves that the PA lies in the Core, i.e., for any deviation from the PA, there exists a user i ∈ S that does not strictly lower its cost.
We continue to show that the Core is not a singleton by constructing a different routing strategyf , whose corresponding cost vector also lies in the Core. For a network with L = 1, this is trivial. Thus, consider a network with L > 1 and order the links at the system optimum such that T 1 (f * 1 ) ≤ . . . ≤ T L (f * L ). We can now construct a new feasible routing strategy profile,f , by choosing two users i, j and two links {l, n}, l < n, for which f * l > 0 and f * n > 0. Atf users i, j exchange their flow such thatf i
and ∀k = i, j, ∀s ∈ L,f k s = r k R f * s . First consider the system optimum to differ from the Wardrop equilibrium, i.e., the system optimum does not behave according to (3) . Thus, the inequality in (13) is strict and we can pick a small enough > 0 so that the inequality still holds. Now consider the system optimum to behave as (3) . It follows that ∀l ∈ L, T l (f l ) ≡ T and an exchange of flow between users does not change their cost for any valid . Consequently, the inequality in (13) still holds. This proves that the Core incorporates multiple routing strategy profiles.
Theorem 2 states that, if all users send their demand according to the proportional routing strategy, then (i) the system is optimal and (ii) none of the 2 N − 1 possible coalitions would benefit by deviating from this strategy. However, since the Core is not a singleton, we consider a further refinement of the Core with additional stability guarantees. In particular, where the Core considers coalitional deviations that are pure, i.e., players i ∈ S agree upon a single deviation that is final, the Inner Core provides stability against a series of deviating coalitions, with a probability distribution on their formation. Specifically, following [23] , we consider a mediator that invites players to form a deviating coalition S according to a probability η(S). The mediator proposes a series of coalitions together with their probability distribution. Denote the proposal of the mediator as a pair (η, Y) where η is a probability distribution and Y is a function on the set of coalitions. Specifically, η(S) denotes the probability that S will deviate and Y(S) = (Y i (S)) i∈S ∈ V (S) represents the cost of the users in the coalition S, when deviating. A cost vector is strongly inhibitive if there does not exist any proposition (η, Y) in which no user increases its expected cost, [23] :
Given an NTU coalitional game V (·), a cost vectorJ is strongly inhibitive iff for any proposed randomized deviation (η, Y), ∃i ∈ N :
Moreover, a strongly inhibitive cost vectorJ lies in the Inner Core if by perturbing it by an arbitrarily small amount we get another strongly inhibitive cost vector. (See [23] ).
Thus, for any vector in the Inner Core, and any possible randomized deviation, there exists at least one user that strictly increases its expected cost under such randomized deviations. Clearly, this also includes any pure deviation, i.e., the Inner Core lies in the Core.
Theorem 3. If the Wardrop equilibrium is not system optimal, the Proportional Allocation, (5) , lies in the Inner Core.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
Since the Wardrop equilibrium is typically far from optimal (see [29] and many others), Theorem 3 proves the PA to be a very stable cost allocation. Yet, out of all the stable cost vectors in the (Inner) Core, which one should we pick? We aim to focus on an allocation that keeps the system at its optimum, with added fairness properties for the users. In particular, we concentrate on a cost vector with min-max fairness guarantees, namely the Nucleolus, [31] . To that end, we show how to make the users' costs somewhat transferable between each other. 6
From NTU to TU
Until now we have considered a NTU game, since our standard costs, e.g., delay, typically do not represent a cost that can be freely transfered between users in a coalition. However, suppose we only consider solution concepts at the system optimum 7 , and exchange flows between each other, while keeping the aggregated flow fixed. Thus, we (i) keep the aggregated link flows, i f i l = f * l , constant and (ii) find two users i, j and exchange their flows between two links l, n, as done in the proof of Theorem 2. Now, each user incurs the same cost per unit of flow on each link l, T l (f * l ) and we have made our costs somewhat "transferable". Of course users' costs cannot equal any value, since there still exist feasibility constraints on the users' flows. Nevertheless, it does allow us to investigate solution concepts, which assume transferable utility. Specifically, we investigate the TU Nucleolus, which is min-max fair, stable against coalitional deviations and de facto induces the system optimum 8 . In our TU game, we equate v(S) to the worst-case solution of each coalition, i.e., ∀S ⊆ N , v(S) = i∈SĴ i (S).
The Nucleolus
The excess of each coalition S ⊂ N at a proposed cost vector, J, is defined as e S (J) = 
where ≺ lxm means that it is smaller in the lexicographical sense. Hence, the Nucleolus treats the average welfare of coalitions in a min-max fair manner. Note that for a cost vector J c in the Core, ∀S, e S (J c ) ≤ 0. Thus, if the Nucleolus exists, it de facto lies in the Core 9 .
Lemma 3. The Nucleolus resides in a compact, convex set. Thus, it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
We now consider two interesting cases of symmetric users.
[1] (Symmetric demands): All users have equal demands: ∀i, j ∈ N , r i = r j .
[2] (Symmetric threats): The averaged worst-case "threat" is equal for all users: ∀S 1 , S 2 ,
For instance, this occurs if every user i, when acting as a Stackelberg leader, can bring the system to its Wardrop equilibrium. In that case: ∀S ∈ N :
Lemma 4. For both symmetric demands and symmetric threats, the Nucleolus is equal to the Proportional Allocation.
Proof. We first consider Case 1, where all users have symmetric demands. Denote the PA cost vector byJ * . It follows that ∀S ⊂ N :
From (12), for coalitions S 1 , S 2 , with i∈S1 r i = i∈S2 r i , v(S 1 ) = v(S 2 ). Hence, atJ * , e S1 (J * ) = e S2 (J * ). Since, ∀i, j ∈ N , r i = r j , it follows that for S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N with |S 1 | = |S 2 |, atJ * , e S1 (J * ) = e S2 (J * ). Moreover, from (12), for S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N with |S 1 | = |N | − 1, e S1 (J * ) ≥ e S2 (J * ). Consequently, the Nucleolus aims to minimize the excess of the largest coalitions with respect to their amount of users. It follows that there exist N −1 N = N different coalitions for which |S| = N − 1 and they all have equal excesses. Now assume by contradiction that there exists a cost vectorJ ∈ J * sys withJ ≺ lxmJ * . In other words, assume that ∀S ⊆ N for which |S| = N − 1 it holds that e S (J) < e S (J * ) or equivalently ∀S ⊆ N for which |S| = N − 1:
From (17) we get:
which is a contradiction. Now consider Case 2. The Proportional Allocation lexicographically minimizes e * (J), since the excess of a coalition at the PA is equal ∀S ⊂ N :
Even though the Nucleolus has attractive fairness and stability properties, it has been shown that it is hard to compute [14] . Many methods solve N linear program with 2 N − 2 constraints, one for every possible coalition. Moreover, in our setting we need to add feasibility constraints on the users' flows. However, in networking settings, there often exists a small number of values of different user demands, which we denote by K. That is, for a user i, its demand r i can take up to K different values. From (12) and our definition of v(S) it follows that, for two coalitions S 1 , S 2 , if i∈S1 r i = i∈S2 r i then v(S 1 ) = v(S 2 ). Thus, the Nucleolus treats them in a similar fashion and we only need one constraint for either coalition. The following theorem shows that we can significantly decrease the amount of constraints in each linear program when K is small enough. Proof. For each coalition with |S| users, we need to find all possibilities for the values of its demand i∈S r i . This can be equated to a "balls and bins" scenario where we need to place |S| indistinguishable balls in K distinguishable bins. The different ways to do this are: |S|+K−1 K−1
. We now sum over all sizes of coalitions. Thus, we get that the different possibilities of the coalition demands equals:
We need to solve a maximum of N different linear programs, see [14] , thus the upper bound follows.
Thus, for a small enough K, the amount of constraints needed in the linear program is a lot smaller than 2 N . In particular, Theorem 4.4 implies the following:
Corollary 1. For K = O(1), the computation of the Nucleolus can be handled within polynomial time complexity.
Having computed the Nucleolus, we obtain a cost vector that is (i) system optimal, (ii) stable against group deviations and (iii) entails min-max fairness guarantees.
Conclusions
We investigated a coalitional networking game from a worst-case perspective. Specifically, our study focused on load balancing (routing) among servers (links). Our motivation behind viewing coalitions in their worst-case scenario follows from the existence of networking contexts with (seemingly) malicious agents. In order to describe the value of every of the 2 N coalitions, we defined a worst-case Stackelberg game. We proved that the malicious leader acts as if it is a continuum of infinitesimal self-optimizing users. Using this surprising result, we continued to established that the Proportional Allocation always lies in the Core, generally lies in the Inner Core and in specific symmetric cases equals the Nucleolus. As a result, a design guideline would be to make a mediator, e.g., a network administrator, propose to all agents in the network to route their flow proportionally to the optimum. Alternatively, all agents can issue a credible threat and act offensively towards agents that deviate from the Proportional Allocation, by making them incur their worst-case costs. This is favorable for each agent as well as for the entire system.
